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  Neither square circles nor manned lunar stations exist. But might they fail to exist 
in different ways? A common assumption is “no”: everything that fails to exist, fails to 
exist in exactly the same way. Non-being doesn’t have joints or structure, the thinking 
goes—it is just a vast, undifferentiated nothingness. Even proponents of ontological 
pluralism, the view that there are multiple ways of being, do not entertain the possibility 
of multiple ways of non-being. 
 This paper is dedicated to the latter idea. I argue that ontological pluralism about 
non-being, roughly, the view that there are multiple ways of non-being, is both more 
plausible and defensible and than it first seems, and it has many useful applications 
across a wide variety of metaphysical and explanatory problems.1  
 Here is the plan. In section 1, I lay out ontological pluralism about non-being in 
detail, drawing on principles of ontological pluralism about being. I address whether and 
how the two pluralisms interact: some pluralists about non-being are monists about being, 
and vice-versa. I discuss logical quantification strategies for pluralists about non-being. 
In Section 2, I examine precedent for pluralism about non-being in the history of 
philosophy. In section 3, I discuss several applications of pluralism about non-being. I 
suggest that the view has explanatory power across a variety of domains, and that the  
view can account for differences between nonexistent past and future times, between 
omissions and absences, and between different kinds of fictional objects. 
 
1. Ontological Pluralism 
    
 Ontological pluralism, the view that there are multiple fundamental ways of 
being, has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity in recent years. According to the 
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  Ontological pluralism about non-being holds that there are fundamental differences in types of non-being, 
not just differences in the characteristics of nonexistents. 
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ontological pluralist, entities can exist differently than each other: a number, for example, 
exists in a different way than a chair. According to the ontological pluralist, there are 
several fundamental different ways, modes, or kinds of being: some things exist in 
different ways than other things. These types of being are fundamental and irreducible to 
each other. For some ontological pluralists, there is no univocal category, being, to which 
all things belong. Rather, there is being1, being2, etc.2 For other ontological pluralists, 
there is a univocal category of being that is less fundamental than types of being. I will 
remain neutral on these different pluralist strands.  
 Ontological pluralism suggests a connection between something’s existence and 
its essence: there is a relationship between what kind of being something has and the 
particular sort of thing that it is. A number can exist1, for example, but cannot exist2: a 
number can never be a chair, no matter how much it changes. Specifically, there is a 
relationship between a thing’s strict essence—what it is to be that thing—and the kind of 
being that it has. If what it is to be a chair is to have four spatially extended legs and a 
seat, for example, then being a chair implies that the chair is a concretum. For the 
pluralist, questions about an entity’s being and its essence overlap heavily.3 
 If there are multiple ways of being, then taking an exhaustive inventory of reality 
requires more than listing what there is. As Cameron (2018) puts it, ontological pluralism 
means that there is more structure in the world than we thought there was: an extra 
dimension of existential sorting for which we must account. Drawing on the Quinean 
connection between existence and existential quantification, contemporary friends of 
ontological pluralism like Turner (2010, forthcoming) and McDaniel (2009) take 
seriously the idea that any theory that accurately describes reality make use of more than 
one singular first-order existential quantifier in order to represent this extra structure. For 
some pluralists, these multiple restricted quantifiers are more “natural” than the singular 
unrestricted existential quantifier—they describe reality in a more accurate and finer-
grained way.  
 Suppose that a pluralist takes there to be a fundamental difference between 
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  Canonical forms of ontological pluralism take there to be two equally fundamental ways of being, but 
there might be more than two.	  
3	  See McDaniel (2017, p. 277) for a historically-rooted discussion of the relationship essence and existence. 
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abstracta and concreta. When she says that there are numbers and there are chairs, she 
means that there are1 numbers and there are2 chairs. Both existential quantifiers, ∃1 and 
∃2, carve nature at the joints: the existential quantifiers ∃1 and ∃2 are more fundamental 
than ∃.4 If one is taking an inventory of everything that there is, the pluralist’s “is” is 
ambiguous between ∃1 and ∃2, and the items in being must be sorted into either category. 
The pluralist’s inventory is finer-grained than the list that falls in the domain of the single 
first-order existential quantifier, since it includes everything that there either is1 or is2.   
 The pluralist about being is motivated by a desire to account for multiple ranges 
of existents that exhibit very different features from each other. A pluralist might believe 
that numbers exist differently than chairs, that God exists differently than humans, or that 
abstracta exist differently than concreta, to name a few examples. McDaniel (2017) and 
Spencer (2012) point to three overlapping main categories of argument for ontological 
pluralism: theological, phenomenological, and ontological. Theological motivations for 
pluralism involve the ability to explain God’s different mode of existence from other 
non-God things. God is so different from other things, the thinking goes, that she must 
exist differently than everything else. The phenomenological strategy uses the apparent 
experiential differences between, for example, perceiving a number and perceiving a 
chair as evidence of multiple ways of being. Abstracta and concreta are given so 
differently in experience that different sorts of being are the best explanation. The 
ontological strategy proceeds from the idea that different sorts of entities behave 
differently, and ontological pluralism is the best explanation for these fundamental 
differences.  
 Now consider that there are many sorts of nonexistents: omissions, holes, 
shadows, possibilia, impossibilia, and fictions, to name a few examples. Plausibly, there 
are some differences within and between these sorts of nonexistents. The pluralist about 
non-being shares some basic motivations with the pluralist about being: she can best 
explain ontological, phenomenological, and theological phenomena by positing multiple 
forms of non-being. The ontologically-motivated pluralist might take the difference 
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  There is some debate about whether the pluralist should recognize a generic quantifier that ranges over all 
of being, with more fundamental restrictions, or simply deny that there is a generic quantifier. I do not take 
a stand on this issue here, but see Rettler (forthcoming) for an interesting take. See Simmons (forthcoming) 
for a detailed look at whether the pluralist can accept a generic notion of being. 
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between impossible and possible nonexistent objects, or the difference between 
nonexistent past and future times, to be best modeled by a joint in non-being. Another 
pluralist might seek to explain phenomenological differences between thoughts about 
non-existent numbers versus thoughts about nonexistent people. And pluralism about 
non-being opens up a heretofore underexplored option in theological space: a theist can 
believe that God doesn’t always exist, but can plausibly come into being and go out of 
being. It would be natural for her to hold that God’s non-being is different than run-of-
the-mill non-being had by mere objects and persons: it’s a special, divine sort of non-
being. (In Section 2 below, I discuss some historical precedent for this view.) 
 With these motivations in hand, we are in a position to investigate non-being. Call 
ontological pluralism about non-being the view that there are several fundamental 
different ways, modes, or kinds of non-being. Non-being has structure beyond the list of 
what does not exist: things that fail to exist, fail to exist differently than each other. If one 
is a certain kind of pluralist about non-being for concreta and abstracta, for example, 
nonexistent chairs and numbers do not share a univocal property of non-being. If we wish 
to speak of both, we must say that the chair has non-being1, and the number has non-
being2. Non-being is not a univocal property: speaking of something’s non-being is 
ambiguous between non-being1 and non-being2.   
 The pluralist about non-being might or might not embrace the same attitude 
towards being: she can believe in ways of non-being and being, or just one or the other.5 
Call a bilateral pluralist one who believes in multiple ways of being and non-being, and 
unilateral pluralist one who believes in just one or the other. Such a unilateral pluralist 
could hold, for example, that a square circle and a nonexistent chair have different ways 
of non-being, but that all existents exist the same way. And the bilateral pluralist need not 
believe that the joints in non-being mirror those in being: she might accept differences in 
nonexistence between impossible and possible objects, but differences in existence 
between abstracta and concreta.6 Call bilateral pluralists who believe in different joints 
in being and non-being asymmetric pluralists, and those who believe in equivalent joints 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Plausibly, the Stoics had this view. See Caston (1999) for subtle interpretation of the Stoics on non-being 
and nonexistence. 
6	  Both symmetric and asymmetric pluralists may be what Caplan (2011) calls superpluralists, roughly, 
those who believe in different ways of being an ontological pluralist. 
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in being and non-being symmetric pluralists. 
 The pluralist about non-being stipulates that there is a sort of structure in non-
being. Though different kinds of pluralists might stipulate different kinds of structure, a 
common view of structure is a “pegboard” model, thus described by Turner: 
 
 “Ontological structure is the sort of structure we could adequately represent with a 
 pegboard and rubber bands. The pegs represent things, and the rubber bands 
 represent ways these things are and are interrelated.” (2011, p. 2) 
 
The non-being pluralist accepts a “multiple pegboards” picture, according to which there 
are two different kinds of propertied and related items in non-being. As there can be 
relations across kinds of being (I, a concretum, can think of a number, an abstractum), 
there can be relations across kinds of non-being (I am such that I do not eat square 
circles). 
  Just as the ontologist of being has principles for discerning how many things 
exist, so too the ontologist of non-being can ask how many things don’t exist. The latter 
takes the task of creating an ontological inventory one step further: she asks how many 
entities fail to exist in more specific ways. The pluralist about non-being is as much an 
ontologist as that of being, since she seeks a sorted inventory of everything that fails to 
exist.  
 Believing in ways of being transforms questions about existence into questions 
about multiple forms of existence. McDaniel (2013), for example, suggests that 
ontological pluralism splits the question of why there is something rather than nothing 
into multiple questions: 
 
 “If there are modes of being, that is, different ways to be, then either in addition to 
 or instead of the question “why is there something, rather than nothing?”, we 
 should pursue, for each mode of being, the question of why there is, in that 
 way, something rather than nothing.” (2013, p. 277) 
 
Similarly, the friend of ways of non-being splits the something-rather-than-nothing 
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question into multiple finer-grained questions. The unilateral pluralist turns that question 
into: “why is there something rather than nothing1 or nothing2?” The bilateral pluralist 
would ask: “why is there1 something1 or there2 something2 rather than nothing1 or 
nothing2?”   
 Denying that something exists is different than conveying that it has a specific 
sort of non-being. The former involves straightforward negative existential 
quantification, whereas the latter requires stipulation of an entity that has a specific kind 
of non-being. Supposing I am a unilateral pluralist about non-being, when I say “There is 
no Tyrannosaurus Rex with pink feathers in South Bend, Indiana”, I do not necessarily 
mean that there is a Tyrannosaurus Rex with pink feathers that has non-being1. Rather, I 
intend to convey that there just isn’t anything that corresponds to that description. Note 
the difference between this sort of statement and one that is intended to convey that a 
nonexistent object is in some sense “out there” in liminal reality, as in “There is a Greek 
god of war.”  
 This juncture is where one might turn to existential quantification in order to sort 
things out. One option follows Parsons (1980), Jacquette (1996), Zalta (1988), and Priest 
(2005) in positing different notations for “there is” (∃) and “there exists” (E!).	  Depending 
on one’s system, one can either have a special quantifier, or an existence predicate for 
only things that exist. Here I focus on the predicate strategy. On this scheme, the logical 
form for “There is an x such that x doesn’t exist” is ∃x(px & ¬E!x). “There is a square 
circle but it doesn’t exist”, for example, becomes ∃x(scx & ¬E!x). Now, one might be 
tempted to hold that the logical form for a unilateral non-being pluralist’s claim is ∃x(px 
& ¬E!1x), or “There is an x such that x doesn’t exist1”. The specific claim about the 
square circle becomes ∃x(scx & ¬E!1x), or “There is a square circle that doesn’t exist1”. 
The problem with this logical form is that it is better interpreted as a claim made by a 
pluralist about being than a pluralist about non-being: it denies a particular positive way 
of being to the square circle, but does not postulate a specific way of non-being. 
 With a bit of tweaking, however, the dual notation strategy can be easily adopted 
by the friend of non-being. As above, let ∃ denote ontologically neutral “there is” and E! 
denote ontologically committed “there exists”. Subscripts denote ways of being. 
Distinguish between two claims that a pluralist about non-being may wish to make: (i) 
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there are no square circles, and (ii) square circles have non-being1. The former denies that 
there is anything in being or non-being meeting the description “square circle”; the latter 
accords a spot in non-being1 to a square circle. The first claim can be represented with 
 
   ¬∃x(scx)  
 
to be interpreted as “There are no square circles.” The second, substantive claim about 
non-being can be represented with          (∃1x)(scx & ¬E!x)   
 
or “There is1 a square circle, and anything that exists is not it.” (A more perspicuous, less 
introduction-to-logic-y translation is “There is1 a square circle, and it does not exist.”) 
 Here is one way to understand the latter claim. Assuming that there is an 
ontologically neutral sense in which the square circle is “out there”, that leaves two 
options with respect to heavy-duty ontological commitment to the square circle: either the 
square circle has non-being, or it has existence. A square circle can’t have existence. But 
it can have non-being. By utilizing both the neutral quantifier and the committed 
existence predicate, the friend of non-being can hold that square circles have a specific 
kind of non-being without having existence. What is distinctive for the pluralist is that the 
subscripted notation, “∃1x”, specifies a particular mode of non-being—a way of being 
“out there”-- for the square circle. “¬E!x” denies the existence of the square circle. 
 Another option for representing assertions of pluralistic non-being is to imbue 
logical negations themselves with ontological import. Let ¬1 mean “there is not1” and ¬2 
mean “there is not2.”  For the pluralist about non-being, ¬1∃ and ¬2∃ carve non-being 
closer to the joints than ¬∃. Note that these notations are different than ¬∃1 and ¬∃2: the 
former represent ways of non-being, whereas the latter represent negations of ways of 
being. Suppose that a pluralist believes in a fundamental difference between possible and 
impossible nonexistents. If she wants to hold that a square circle has non-being1, she 
would represent such a claim as ¬1∃x(scx), or “There is not1 a square circle.” This claim 
is substantively different than “The square circle doesn’t exist1”, which only denies a 
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certain form of positive being. The notation with the restricted logical negation explicitly 
reserves a spot for the chair in the inventory of non-being1.	  The friend of this strategy 
incurs a few extra explanatory burdens: she must explain what subscripted negation is. 
And she must also reckon with the meaning of the subscripted negation in contexts with 
less ontological importance. For example, she should explain what it means to be not1 
hungry or not2 red. Nonetheless, it is option worth exploring. 
 Now, a natural objection to ontological pluralism about non-being is that it overly 
reifies non-existence. The thought is that being has a kind of oomph that distinguishes it 
from non-being. The pretheoretic concept of non-being is that it is a hazy, unstructured 
nothingness-- it does not include natural joints and structure. While being enjoys rich 
structure and complexity, non-being is just a label under which nonexistent things fall. 
Being is ontologically thick, the thinking goes, while non-being is thin and formless.  
 A closely related objection holds that pluralism about non-being reifies specific 
nonexistents. Consider the athiest who says: “Look. When I say that God does not exist, I 
mean that she really does not exist. I do not mean that there is an omniscient, all-powerful 
being sitting around in non-being, with all of the details properties and contours of an 
existent, but inhering in a different ontological category. I mean that there isn’t anything 
like that, in any sense.” If the things that have non-being have substance, the worry goes, 
they become very being-like. We should be able to deny that things exist full stop. 
 The pluralist has several lines of response to these lines of thinking. In reply to the 
objector who worries about reifying nonexistents with too much specificity, she can hold 
that not every description corresponds to an item in non-being. Consider the description 
“being such that one is a golden dragon if each member of the Beatles wears a red hat on 
a Tuesday”. Even if nothing of that description exists, one need not accept that this 
description exactly corresponds to an item in non-being: plentitudinous descriptions do 
not necessarily equate to plentitudinous items in non-being. 
 Accepting reified nonexistents can also be theoretically useful. Suppose that a 
theist and an atheist disagree on the existence of God on Cartesian grounds. The theist 
thinks that God must exist because existence is more perfect than nonexistence. The 
atheist thinks that God doesn’t exist because nonexistence isn’t necessarily better than 
existence. Here, the atheist would be well-served by a reified nonexistent, God, about 
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whose nature she can argue. Utilizing straightforward negative existential quantification 
is less useful than granting God a kind of non-being, but arguing about her nature. 
 
2. Historical Precedent for Pluralism about Non-Being 
 
 The pluralist follows Meinong (1904) in accepting the idea that things can have a 
kind of being without having existence. Meinong famously distinguished between objects 
that exist (you, your iPhone, the Eiffel Tower), things that subsist (the number twelve, the 
proposition that snow is white), and impossible things that neither exist nor subsist (a 
round square, the proof that 2+2 = 5).7 Pluralism about non-being captures some of the 
spirit of Meinongianism insofar as some nonexistent things have what others take to be 
the hallmarks of being: properties, relations, and classification under distinct ontological 
categories. Subsistence is an ontologically rich form of non-being rather than a hazy 
nothingness without structure.  
 There are many available Meinongian positions in logical space available to the 
pluralist about non-being. One option is to hew very closely to the letter of Meinong’s 
theory, while another option is to abandon the letter and remain close to the spirit. 
Consider the unilateral pluralist who believes in one way of being, but two ways of non-
being: one for impossible things and one for merely nonexistent things. This sort of 
pluralist shares a tripartite ontology of being and non-being with Meinong, as the major 
ontological joints fall in very similar, and possibly identical, places. Other pluralists 
might embrace the spirit of Meinongianism but fall father from the original view. For 
example, some pluralists about non-being might take the division in nonexistent things to 
lie between, e.g., God and non-God things rather than possible and impossible things. 
And the symmetric pluralist postulates joints in being in addition to those in non-being. 
How many joints there are, and where they fall, determine whether a pluralist is 
Meinongian or merely neo-Meinongian. Either way, accepting the substantivity of non-
being has a strong whiff of Meinongianism.  
 In addition to Meinong’s friendliness to substantive non-being, there is scattered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Here I follow Reicher (2019) in taking this to be a plausible interpretation of Meinong, though Meinong 
interpretation is a controversial matter. 
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historical precedent for accepting different ways of non-being. Here I will discuss a few 
instances, though I expect that there are more if one searches for them. 
 Following Moran and Guiu (2019), I interpret John Scotus Eriugena as positing  
five modes of being and correlative modes of non-being. There are things accessible to 
senses (and things that are not), orders of created natures (and their differences), actual 
things (and potential non-things), things perceived by the intellect alone (and those that 
are not), and those infused with divine grace (and those that are not.) The joints in non-
being mirror those in being. Arguably, Eriugena also makes use of a distinctive form of 
non-being to make sense of God’s self-creation. He holds that God is beyond being and 
non-being, but gradually self-creates from “divine darkness” into light. Such “divine 
darkness” is a special kind of non-being from which being stems, and is different than 
ordinary nonexistence.8  
 Simone Weil (1947, p. xxi) makes similar use of a special form of non-being to 
make sense of an “absent god”. According to Weil, God “withdrew” from full existence 
in order to make room for the universe. Persons, too, are created from the space in which 
God has deserted: a distinct form of non-being from whence being arises. 
 Theological motivations were not the only underpinnings of historical pluralism 
about non-being. The Stoics believed in multiple fundamental types of incorporeal 
entities: time, place, void, and expressibles. Following Long and Sedley (1987), I take the 
fundamental unit of Stoic ontology to be the “something”, or the thing that exists. A 
common reading of the Stoics is that what it is to be something—that is, what it is to 
exist-- is to be an object of thought and discourse. But certain objects like centaurs, while 
being proper objects of thought and discourse, do not exist. The Stoics thus posit a 
liminal sort of existence, subsistence, that characterizes nonexistent objects. According to 
this view, there are “somethings” that do not exist. Caston (1999) suggests that this 
reading creates a contradiction: there are things that do not count as things. He argues for 
an interpretation of Stoic ontology that avoids this contradiction, according to which each 
universal is a “something”, but is not necessarily real. Essentially, there are nonexistent 
“somethings” that are different than other nonexistents. Apart from particular interpretive 
matters, it is clear that the Stoics were friendly to different ways of thinking about non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Bosley and Tweedale (2006, p. 573) also support this reading. 
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being. 
 Sartre (1969) affirms the reality of nothingness (“le néant”), and distinguishes 
between at least two sorts of non-beings. There is a concrete kind of nothingness as 
represented by an absence—for example, a friend failing to show up for a meal—and a 
more abstract kind of nothingness exemplified by square circles. Absences are brought 
about by human consciousness insofar as they products of expectations. Sartre’s view 
draws on his admiration of Heidegger’s work on nothingness, in which he infamously 
claimed “The nothing itself nothings.” Nozick took up the task of ontologically 
interpreting Heidegger’s claim: 
 
 “Imagine this force as a vacuum force, sucking things into nonexistence or 
 keeping them there. If this force acts upon itself, it sucks nothingness into 
 nothingness, producing something or, perhaps, everything, every possibility. If we 
 introduced the verb “to nothing” to denote what this nothingness force does to 
 things as it makes or keeps them nonexistent, then (we would say) the nothingness 
 nothings itself.” (1981, p. 123) 
 
While Nozick’s approach doesn’t stipulate pluralism about non-being, such a conception 
of non-being takes it seriously as having distinctive behavior. Viewing non-being as a 
kind of force or actor is a foundation for the idea that different nonexistents behave 
differently.9 
   
3. What Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being Can Do 
 
 Ontological pluralism about non-being can be applied to a number of issues in 
metaphysics. There are few points to which I will attend before enumerating them. First, 
one might wish to deploy degrees of non-being rather than ways of non-being for some of 
these issues. Here I do not focus on this view, but it is worth mentioning the possibility. 
Second, it should be obvious that one would not want to hold all of these pluralisms 
about non-being at once; this discussion is simply intended to be a case study of various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See Skow (2010) for an analysis of Nozick’s claim informed by contemporary physics. 
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applications. Finally, the list is not exhaustive: there are likely many more applications of 
ways of non-being than I discuss in this section. 
 
a. Presentist Ontological Pluralism about Non-Present Events and Objects 
 Presentists about time believe that only the present events and objects exist. They 
are to be contrasted with eternalists, who believe that all events and objects exist, and 
growing block theorists, who hold that past and present events and objects exist. For 
growing block theorists, existence distinguishes future events from past and present ones. 
For both presentists and eternalists, there are no ontological differences between past and 
future events: they don’t exist for presentists, and they do exist for eternalists. 
 One explanatory burden for ontologies of time is to account for the apparent 
differences between the past and the future. For example, the past seems fixed and 
unchangeable in a way that the future is not. Humans often prefer pain to be in their past 
and pleasure to be in their future. And the direction of causation seems to run from the 
past to the future.  
 Presentists have a unique explanatory possibility, however. The presentist can 
accept a certain kind of pluralism about non-being, according to which the past and the 
future are fundamentally different kinds of non-being. Presentist pluralism about non-
present times challenges the dominant assumption in the presentist literature that the two 
kinds of unreality are the same kind.10 Past and future events have different kinds of non-
being, and they do not share a univocal property of non-being. Consider a past and future 
event: your birth and your lunch one month from now. The pluralist presentist can hold 
that the birth has past nonexistence and the lunch has future nonexistence. The present 
moment is the ontological cleavage between the two fundamental ways of non-being.11 
Events do not fail to exist simpliciter; they fail to exist in more specific ways.  
 Different ways of non-being can help explain phenomenological differences 
between experiences of the past and the future: we remember one, but not the other. The 
past and the future differ in the way they are given to us in experience. The view also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Prior hints at this view, presumably unintentionally, in writing that “The present simply is the real 
considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future.” (1972, p. 245) 
11	  McDaniel (2017, pp. 81-86) proposes that pluralism be applied to ontological differences between the 
past and the present.	  
	   13	  
supports ontological differences past and future-- for example, the fixity of the past and 
the openness of the future.12 
 According to some essentialist interpretations of ontological pluralism, something 
that has one kind of being can never have the other sort of being. To use an earlier 
example, a chair can never be a number. The presentist friend of pluralism should deny 
the equivalent view about non-being, since moments that have one kind of non-being will 
eventually have the other kind of non-being: future moments will become past moments. 
   
b. Omissions versus Absences 
 Intuitively, there are differences between omissions, roughly, events that are close 
to occurring but do not occur, and absences, roughly, things that are not close to 
occurring and do not occur. I caused my plant’s death by omitting to water it; I very well 
could have watered it. I also did not go shopping with Abraham Lincoln last night, 
leaving me to wonder whether he would have liked the shoes that I eventually picked out. 
But I could not have gone shopping with Abraham Lincoln: such an event was not even 
close to occurring. A puzzle for causation theorists is how to distinguish between 
omissions and absences: both do not exist, but one seems intuitively different from the 
other. Omissions cause things to happen; mere absences do not, or at least do not exert 
the same kind of causal power. 
 It might be initially tempting to distinguish between absences and omissions on 
the basis of their possibility: absences are not causally efficacious because they are 
impossible events, but omissions are causally efficacious because they are possible. It is 
impossible to go shopping with Abraham Lincoln, after all, while it is possible to set an 
alarm clock.  
 But drawing the line between omissions and absences on the basis of possibility is 
wrong, for several reasons. First, some omissions are impossible. Suppose that the 
assistant professor fails to prove that 2+2=5, and is thus denied tenure. In Bernstein 
(2016), I argue for the position that such omissions are causally efficacious. Suppose that 
one accepts a simple counterfactual account of causation, according to which c is a cause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  In this vein, Cameron (2011), a rare contemporary friend of pluralism about non-being, argues that the 
view can help reconcile presentism with truthmaker theory.  
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of e if e would not have occurred had c not occurred. Then many omissive causal 
statements come out as true, including ones involving impossible omissions. The 
counterpossible “If she hadn’t failed to prove that 2+2=5, she would have been awarded 
tenure” is true and non-vacuous. Such causal counterpossibles also furnish correct 
predictions and explanations. In some contexts, impossible events are closer to actuality 
than possible ones.  
 Another reason not to draw the absence/ omission distinction in terms of 
possibility is that many absences are intuitively possible, but causally inefficacious. 
There is no actual-size replica of the city of Paris in the empty fields between 
Indianapolis and Chicago, but such a thing is possible. It’s not even close to occurring: 
it’s simply not there. Without a particular causal or predictive context, this absence 
doesn’t cause anything to happen, even though it is possible. Impossibility and possibility 
do not correctly carve the absence/ omission distinction.  
 The ontological pluralist about non-being has a ready solution, however: she can 
hold that absences and omissions have different ways of non-being. Here’s how it would 
work. In the case of my failing to water the plant, there are at least two non-beings: the 
omission of my watering the plant, and the absence of my watering the plant.  
Supposing that absences have non-being1 and omissions have non-being2, they are 
fundamentally ontologically distinctive. One virtue of this view is that one need not 
identify a particular non-event as an absence or an omission, since both non-beings 
correspond to a particular non-event. There is an absence with non-being1 of the plant- 
watering, and an omission with non-being2 of the plant-watering. One is non-causal and 
the other is causal. Context makes one or the other salient. 
 A virtue of the view is that it helps with the problem of profligate omissions. The 
problem is as follows. Suppose that one accepts a simple counterfactual account of 
causation, according to which c is a cause of e if e would not have occurred had c not 
occurred. And suppose that one accepts that omissions can be causes. Then, for any 
particular omission that is a cause, there will also be countless other counterfactual 
dependence-generating non-occurrences. For example, the counterfactual “Had I not 
failed to water the plant, the plant would not have died” is intuitively true, but so is “Had 
Barack Obama not failed to water the plant, the plant would not have died.” Many more 
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non-occurrences count as causes than are intuitively so. 
 The pluralist about non-being, however, has a ready explanation for this problem. 
For she can hold that there are a select few omissions, non-beings with causal efficacy, 
which have one way of non-being. And she can hold that there are profligate absences, 
non-beings without causal efficacy, which have another way of non-being. This pluralist 
accepts a plentitude of non-beings that are absences, but only a select few non-beings that 
are omissions. That way, the pluralist can account for the countless non-occurrences that 
are happening at any given time without ascribing them all causal efficacy. 
 For the proponent of this solution, multiple relevant distinctions will be 
hyperintensional. There is a hyperintensional phenomenon where the sentential positions 
of two necessarily extensionally equivalent entities are not intersubstitutable salva 
veritate—that is, when changing out the positions of necessary equivalents changes the 
truth value of a sentence. If one believes that impossible worlds are nonexistents, then 
any two impossible worlds admit of hyperintensional distinctions. Some impossible 
omissive statements are hyperintensional: every world at which the circle fails to be a 
square is also a world in which two plus three fails to equal six. But these are different 
omissions. Omissions and absences might also be hyperintensional: every world where 
the mathematician couldn’t have proved that 2+2=5 is also a world where she failed to 
prove that 2+2=5. But, intuitively, the absence is different than the omission. Pluralism 
about non-being does justice to these differences between negative entities relevant to 
causation and causal explanation. 
 
c. The Ontology of Fictions 
 Another area where positing ways of non-being is useful is in accounting for the 
ontology of fictional objects. Fictional objects are those objects posited by works of 
fiction, like Captain Yossarian in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, the nameless narrator in 
Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, and Issa Dee in HBO’s Insecure. On the one 
hand, such objects do not intuitively exist in the “full” sense that you and I exist—we 
cannot physically interact with them, change them, or bump into them in the supermarket. 
On the other hand, fictional objects seem to exist in some other, more robust sense than 
fully nonexistent objects.  
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 Ways of non-being can account for this difference: the pluralist about non-being 
can hold that fictional objects have one kind of non-being and other nonexistent objects 
have another kind of non-being. This fundamental ontological distinction respects the 
intuitive difference between fictional objects and simply nonexistent objects, while doing 
justice to the idea that they don’t exist the way that you and I exist. 
 Another place that pluralism about non-being can be of use is in distinguishing 
between impossible and possible fictions. Impossible fictions are fictions that describe 
impossible entities or scenarios. Such scenarios are particularly common in fiction 
involving time travel. Pluralism accounts for such differences by positing different kinds 
of non-being for impossible and possible fictional entities: impossible mathematical 
entities, like the proof of the inconsistency of mathematics in Ted Chiang’s “Division by 
Zero”, have different non-being than Yossarian. 
 Pluralism can also be of service in accounting for nested fictions, or fictional 
entities within fictional entities. The HBO television show Insecure features several 
secondary shows-within-the-show. “Due North” is a show-within-the-show set in the pre-
Civil War South with its own actors and well-developed fictional narrative. The third 
season of Insecure includes “Kev’yn”, a comedy series-within-the-show. And the fourth 
season features “Looking for LaToya”, a fictional true crime show-within-the-show. In 
each case, the nested show is a distinct fictional entity from Insecure, with its own plot 
and characters. The characters in Insecure think about and discuss each nested show, but 
like us, they do not physically interact with fictions. 
 One reason is it important to distinguish between nested and primary fictions is 
that we want a way of justifying statements of the form “According to the fiction, ____.” 
Truth-according-to-a-fiction is often seen as different than truth simpliciter: it is true 
according to the fiction that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, but false that Sherlock 
Holmes smokes a literal pipe. Determining truth-according-to-a-fiction is a fairly easy 
task in cases in which the claim in question is explicitly stated in the fiction. For example, 
Issa Dee, the protagonist of Insecure, lives in Inglewood, so “According to the fiction, 
Issa Dee lives in Inglewood” is true because it is explicitly displayed in the fiction. But in 
cases of nested fictions, it is not necessarily the case that something true according to the 
primary fiction is true according to the secondary fiction, and vice versa. In Kev’yn, for 
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example, Kev’yn and Yolonda stage a protest. It is true according to Kev’yn that they 
stage a protest, but it is not necessarily true according to Insecure. Similarly, it is not 
necessarily true according to Kev’yn that Issa Dee lives in Inglewood. 
 Pluralism about non-being can account for nested fictions by positing distinct 
kinds of non-being for “primary” fictional entities, like those in Insecure, and 
“secondary” nested fictional entities, like those in Kev’yn. The characters and entities in 
Insecure have one sort of non-being, and the characters in each nested fiction have 
another. This way, truths-according-to-Insecure and truths-according-to-Kev’yn are 
grounded in different kinds of nonexistence. “Kev’yn and Yolonda staged a protest” is 
true according to Kev’yn, and “Issa Dee lives in Inglewood” is true according to Insecure. 
The difference in truth conditions is grounded in an ontological joint in non-being.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 The preceding discussion has suggested that ontological pluralism about non-
being, the view that there are multiples ways, kinds, or modes of non-being, is worthy of 
serious philosophical consideration. The view has not enjoyed the same attention as 
pluralism about being, but it is a natural complement to it. The view also has promising 
explanatory power for a range of theological, metaphysical, and phenomenological 
explananda, and deserves extensive further investigation. One need not think that non-
being is, well, nothing: it might have explanatory and metaphysical structure unto itself.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Thanks to Kris McDaniel, Daniel Nolan, Michael Rea, Brad Rettler, and Alex Skiles for helpful 
feedback on this paper. 
	   18	  
References 
Bernstein, Sara (2016). Omission impossible. Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589. 
Bosley, Richard and Tweedale, Martin. (2006). Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy: 
Selected Readings Presenting Interactive Discourse Among the Major Figures, 2nd 
Edition. Broadview Press. 
 
Cameron, Ross. (2018) ‘Critical Study of Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being’, 
Res Philosophica Vol.95, No. 4, p 785-795. 
 
Cameron, Ross (2011). Truthmaking for presentists. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:55-
100. 
 
Caplan, Ben (2011). Ontological superpluralism. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):79-
114. 
 
Caston, Victor (1999). Something and nothing: the Stoics on concepts and 
universals. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17:145-213. 
 
Jacquette, Dale. (1996). Meinongian Logic. The Semantics of Existence and 
Nonexistence (Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy 11), Berlin–New York: de Gruyter. 
 
Long, A. A. & Sedley, D. N. (1989). The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 2, Greek and 
Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. Cambridge University Press. 
 
McDaniel, Kris. (2009) ‘Ways of Being.’ Metametaphysics: New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ontology. Eds. David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 290–319. 
 
McDaniel, Kris. (2017) The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
McDaniel, Kris. (2013) “Ontological Pluralism and the Question of Why There is 
Something Rather than Nothing”, in The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There 
Something Rather Than Nothing?, edited by Tyron Goldshmidt, Routledge. 
 
Meinong, Alexius (ed.), (1904) Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und 
Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth. 
 
Moran, Dermot and Guiu, Adrian, “John Scottus Eriugena”, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/scottus-eriugena/>. 
 
Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
Parsons, Terence (1980). Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
	   19	  
Priest, Graham (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of 
Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 
 
Prior A.N. (1972) The Notion of the Present. In: Fraser J.T., Haber F.C., Müller G.H. 
(eds) The Study of Time. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 
Reicher, Maria, "Nonexistent Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/nonexistent-objects/>. 
 
Simmons, Byron. (forthcoming) “Ontological Pluralism and the Generic Conception of 
Being”, Erkenntnis. 
 
Rettler, Bradley. (forthcoming) “Ways of thinking about ways of being” Analysis. 
 
Sartre, Jean Paul. (1969), Being and Nothingness, trans. H. E. Barnes, New York: 
Washington Square Press. 
 
Skow, Bradford (2010). The Dynamics of Non-Being. Philosophers' Imprint 10. 
 
Spencer, Joshua. (2012) “Ways of Being” Philosophy Compass 7/12: 910–918. 
 
Turner, Jason. (2011) “Ontological Nihilism,” in Dean W. Zimmerman and Karen 
Bennett (eds), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol. 6 (OUP, 2011): 3–54. 
 
Turner, Jason. (2010) “Ontological Pluralism,” The Journal of Philosophy 107.1: 5–34. 
 
Turner, Jason. (forthcoming) “Recent work on ontological pluralism”. In J. Miller & R. 
Bliss (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaphysics. London: Routledge. 
 
Weil, Simone. (1947) Gravity and Grace. (Tr. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr), 
London: Routledge. 
 
Zalta, Edward N. (1988) Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
 
	  
